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Regional integration such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR and FTAA have been flourishing in Latin 
American countries in the 1990s. In addition to these multi-countries FTAs, many bilateral 
FTAs have also emerged both among Latin American countries and between  them and 
extra-regional countries. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the leading factors that are 
behind the proliferation of intra-regional and inter-regional FTAs of Latin American countries.   
We also discuss the prospects for bilateral FTAs between Latin America and Asia, particularly 
focusing on Japan-Mexico and Japan-Chile FTA. Finally, a new approach to cooperation 
between East Asia and Latin America, the East Asia Latin America Forum (EALAF), will be 
examined.     
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Introduction   
 
In the 1990s formal regional integration have been flourishing in Western 
Hemisphere in a variety of ways. Latin American countries have strengthened their relations 
by revitalizing existing sub-regional schemes or launching new important  initiatives. In 
addition to regional integration schemes or multi-countries FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) 
such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR and FTAA, various bilateral FTAs have also emerged both 
among Latin American countries and between them and extra-regional countries in the second 
half of 1990s. Through these regional schemes Latin American countries have increased their 
intra-regional trade much greater than expected. On the other hand, Asian countries have 
continued expanding their trade through “market led integration” without formal agreements 
or other modalities of arrangements, except some regional scheme such as APEC and AFTA 
(Hosono [2000], Nishijima and Smith [1996]). However, very recently, some of the East 
Asian countries are showing strong interests about bilateral FTAs not only within Asia but 
also between Asia and Latin America.   
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze driving forces that are behind the 
proliferation of intra-regional and inter-regional FTAs of Latin American countries and the 
prospects for bilateral FTAs between Latin America and Asia. Section 1 describes the basic 
background of regional integration in Latin America and Section 2 discusses the recent 
developments of bilateral FTAs in Latin America. Section 3 argues the historical process of 
regional integration in Latin America in  the 1990s. Following a simple overview of the 
current economic relations between Latin America and Asia in Section 4, Section 5 analyzes 
the prospects for Japan-Mexico and Japan-Chile FTA. Finally, a new approach to cooperation 
between East Asia and Latin America, the East Asia Latin America Forum (EALAF), will be 
examined in Section 6.     
 
1.  Regionalism in Latin America: its background   
 
The resurgence and development of regionalism in Latin America in the 1990s can 
be explained by the following reasons.   
 
(1) Economic liberalization: 
Regional integration in Latin America is not a new phenomenon. Latin America had 
created numerous regional pacts and frameworks in the 1960s. But it should be noted that the 
regional integration in the 1960s were created in the context of import substituting 
industrialization aiming at enlarging protected markets. On the other hand, regionalism in the   2 
1990s must be understood as one of the indispensable factors to complement and support the 
economic liberalization process. As is well known, Latin American countries started drastic 
policy reforms based on “neo-liberalism” in the middle of 1980s abandoning interventionist 
strategy that had brought serious economic crises in the 1980s. Remarkable outcomes of 
policy reforms are seen in the trade and capital liberalization, and privatization. Figure 1 
shows that very high tariff rates of Latin American countries were reduced very quickly 
within a decade to around 10% to 14% that are almost same to the current level of Asian 
countries where it needed about 30 years. Capital market liberalization also had significant 
impacts on capital inflows to Latin America. As Figure 2 shows net capital inflows increased 
dramatically from US$30.7 billion in 1991 to US$136.9 billion in 1998. Among all, FDI had 
the most prominent increase and it exceeded the FDI into Asia in 1999 (See also Figure 3). 
Privatization process in Latin America also overwhelmed the Asian privatization. During 
1990 to 1998, Latin American countries realized privatization of US$154.2 billion while the 
amount in A sia was only US$38.6 billion (See Figure 4). Therefore it is undeniable that, 
together with drastic policy reforms, regional integration is playing important roles to 




The 1980s was the decade of political democratization for most of Latin American 
countries. Along with the deepening and widening of democratization process in the region, 
political circumstances for regional cooperation have b een emerging. Democratization of 
Brazil and Argentina contributed to hold a presidential meeting in 1985 at Iguaçu (just after a 
few years of democratization of both countries) where the Presidents discussed the regional 
cooperation for the first time. Another example is the settlement of the dispute of 100 years 
between Argentina and Chile over the territory of Beagle strait. These changes in political 
situation in the region contributed to create the conditions that  allowed intra-regional 
cooperation and economic integration. 
 
(3) Increasing regionalism of the US 
The US foreign trade policy had been fundamentally based on a combination of 
multilateralism (GATT) and bilateralism (bilateral negotiation) at least until the end of the 
1980s. But the US strengthened an inclination towards regionalism in the 1990s. The 
president Bush manifested the EAI (Enterprise for the Americas Initiatives) in 1990 that 
intends to form a free trade area of the Americas from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego. In 1994 
the US effectuated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, and showed a strong interest for the first   3 
time in the liberalization process of the APEC at the Seattle Meeting. In December of 1994, 
the US took a leadership at the Miami Summit for attaining a consensus to form FTAA (Free 
Trade Area of the Americas), which contains all countries in the North and South America 
except Cuba. Against these changes in the US attitude towards regionalism, Latin American 
countries responded in various ways: on the one hand, many countries expressed strong 
concerns about joining the FTAA and some countries such as Chile started a negotiation to 
join NAFTA, but on the other hand Southern Cone countries such as Brazil and Argentina 
formed a sub-regional integration, MERCOSUR, to counterbalance against the regionalism of 
the US and to foster their negotiating power.   
 
(4) Increase in “De Facto” intra-regional trade 
The intra-regional trade in Latin America started to increase before the new trends of 
regionalism of the 1990s. While Latin American countries exported only 11.9% of their 
exports to their own region in 1985, the share of the intra-regional trade increased in a rapid 
way to 15.2% in 1990 and 25.6% in 1994. Although the share of intra-regional trade in Latin 
America is much less than that of Asian countries, it should be underlined that the increase in 
“de facto” intra-regional trade provided a fundamental condition to facilitate new initiatives 
for regional integration in the 1990s. 
 
Table 1 Intra-regional trade share of Latin America (%) 
Year  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
%  11.9  15.2  19.1  21.9  25.1  25.6  26.1  27.4  28.4  31.4 
Note: Mexico is not included in Latin America. 
Source: DOT/IMF various years 
 
 
2.  Growing Initiatives towards Bilateral FTA in Latin America 
 
  Besides plurilateral or multi-countries economic integration such as NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR, many  bilateral agreements have emerged in Latin America since the early 
1990s. Particularly two Latin American countries, Chile and Mexico, have independently 
pursued bilateral FTAs with countries throughout Latin America (See Table 2). For instance 
Chile formed FTA with Canada and Mexico, and ECA (Economic  Complementarity   
Agreement) with MERCOSUR and 5 countries (Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru), and CFA ( Cooperation Framework Agreement) with EU. Moreover, Chile initiated 
negotiations with the US, Korea, Central American countries and Cuba to form bilateral 
framework. Mexico is another example that has advanced bilateral regional integration. In   4 
addition to NAFTA and G3 (Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), Mexico formed FTA with EU 
and 7 countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Chile, and three Central American countries) 
by the end of 2000, and signed FTA with EFTA that plans to be in effective from July 1, 2001 
(though it needs ratification). Moreover Mexico formed ECA with Uruguay, Peru, Argentina 
and Brazil, and agreed with these countries to amplify and deepen ECA into comprehensive 
FTA. At the moment, Mexico is  negotiating with  Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Trinidad 
Tobago to form FTA. MERCOSUR also has various bilateral schemes. It signed CFA with EU 
in 1995 that plans to establish FTA by 2005. In 1996, Bolivia and Chile joined MERCOSUR 
as associate members in the framework of an ECA. MERCOSUR formed CFA with CACM 
and ANCOM. Very recently it started negotiation with South Africa for forming FTA.   
  As the fundamental reasons for aggressive attitudes towards bilateral FTA, some 
factors can be listed. (1) Many Latin American countries are using bilateral FTAs as effective 
measures to pursue more thorough policy reforms, (2) WTO meeting in 1999 failed to 
establish a new round for trade liberalization, which led to less confidence about the future 
multilateral liberalization, and (3) APEC has been at a standstill after the Asian financial crisis, 
and seems to lose a momentum for liberalization process. 
  In addition to these basic reasons, there are various reasons from a theoretical point 
of view why these countries are so aggressive for forming bilateral agreements.   
腅 Comparing with multi-countries FTA, the possible number of “sensitive” areas and sectors 
are likely to be small and thus it is easier to attain an agreement. 
腅 A country can select a partner country that would accrue greater benefits with smaller 
difficulties at the negotiation. 
腅 A country can avoid unfavorable liberalization that sometimes results from GATT/WTO 
liberalization process. 
腅 If a country forms plural bilateral FTAs, it would have a stronger position at the 
negotiation to join a multi-countries regional block such as FTAA. 
腅 When plural bilateral FTAs create a network in the region, it would make it easier to form 
multi-countries FTA in the region.     
腅 In the case of not full-fledged trade agreement such as ECA (Economic Complementarity 
Agreement) and CFA (Cooperation Framework Agreement), member countries can start 
cooperation in the areas that are easy to have consents. And ECA and CFA will play an 
important role as a stepping-stone for forming comprehensive FTA. 
腅 If a multi-countries FTA forms a bilateral FTA with outside country, the outside country 
can give a pressure on the multi-countries FTA not to be protectionist, and such bilateral 
FTA would provide the possibility to increase the membership of the multi-countries FTA 
(one of the conditions for “open regionalism”).   5 
In sum, bilateral regional framework will take less time to enter into a treaty and have less 
conflictive negotiation process than multi-countries framework.   
  On the other hand, it should be noted that bilateral FTA is likely to have a series of 
possible disadvantages, which are inclined to result in less open and more protectionist trade 
policy. 
腅 If the bilateral FTA adopts restrictive rules of origin, it will be discriminative to 
non-member countries as any other type of FTA could be. 
腅 Bilateral agreements may leave more opportunities for member countries to exclude the 
sensitive sectors from their agreements, and may prolong the negotiation about these 
sectors. 
腅 Different rules of origin of individual FTA are likely to produce complex and confusing 
forms of discriminations, and the complexity of the rules itself would be an impediment 
for trade that pass through different FTA countries. Moreover complicated rules would 
also be an obstacle when bilateral FTAs are to be unified into a plurilateral FTA such as 
FTAA.   
腅 If FTAs are discriminative against the US, it would make the process towards FTAA more 
difficult. 
腅 When  a  bilateral FTA is a  “hub and spoke” type, it would have  various problems
1. 
Because trade among spoke countries are not liberalized, the hub country can enjoy the 
greater benefits from FTA than spoke countries, which means that the hub is likely to 
oppose FTA among the spoke countries. 
腅 If each bilateral FTA has different rules and spoke countries have different treatments in 
terms of tariff reduction and other facilitation, it would lead to a confrontation among hub 
and spokes.   
腅 In contrast to a member country of some multi-countries FTA, existing spoke country 
generally cannot participate in the negotiation table for a new bilateral FTA with the hub 
country. In such a case, the spoke county is likely to oppose a new spoke country to form 
bilateral FTA with the hub. 
腅 In case that the hub country has a strong negotiating power, the liberalization process 
might be biased in favor of the hub country.   
From a theoretical point of view there are possible risks, which may lead to an inconsistency 
with multilateral liberalization or open regionalism. However it is obvious that bilateral FTAs 
are proliferating in Latin American as a pragmatic way for trade liberalization. 
 
                                        
1  See Chapter XX by Findlay.     6 
3.  Three phases of FTA process in Latin America 
 
  The purpose of this  section is to analyze driving forces  that are behind the 
proliferation of intra-regional and inter-regional FTAs of Latin American countries in the 
1990s. In spite that FTAs are getting more attention of scholars of international economics 
and are now considered to be one of the most effective instruments of trade policy in most of 
the countries of the world
2, there have been only few empirical studies  on the above 
mentioned issues related to FTAs, especially regarding cases of those in which Latin 
American countries are participating.  Therefore, let us discuss driving forces behind their 
initiatives towards FTAs from the first years of  the 1990s, focusing on the three different 
phases of the development of Latin American regionalism.   
 
(1) First Phase: Recognition of FTAs as an effective trade policy instrument 
 
It is well known that the first steps towards liberalization and reforms in the case of 
Mexico were taken after the debt crisis. The first important step to accelerate the process was 
to join GATT in 1986. It is well known also that the foremost important reason why President 
Salinas de Gortari of Mexico decided to look for a FTA with the United States was to finalize 
the efforts of Mexico to liberalize her economy that started from the mid 1980s. When Gorge 
Bush and Carlos Salinas announced in June 1990 that the United States and Mexico would 
have talks on perspective of a bilateral agreement of free trade, it was understood that it meant 
a clear message of the Mexican government to make the liberalization process irreversible 
(See Leycegui [2000], p.30 and Molot [1996], p.310]). According to Leycegui the FTAs 
between Mexico and some other Latin America countries in  the  early 90s were also to 
confirm this same message.   
  On the other hand, Chile’s initiative to extend FTA to a number of countries in the 
region also started from the beginning of the 1990s, although her motivation was clearly 
different from that of Mexico. There were at least two basic reasons why Chile adopted the 
strategy to negotiate FTA with other Latin American countries at that period. First of all, 
Chilean government after the democratic transition wanted to get out of the prolonged 
“diplomatic” isolation from international community as the consequence of  the  General 
Pinochet’s dictatorship. Secondly, from the economic point of view, after almost fifteen years 
of unilateral liberalization, it was more clearly felt that unilateral opening did not necessarily 
improve the Chile’s access to other countries’ markets. 
                                        
2 See, for example, MITI, White Paper on International Trade, 1999. Tokyo.   7 
  In this context, Chile intended to have “preferential, assured and predictable 
opening” through bilateral liberalization. It was also expected that bilateral agreements would 
establish better conditions for market access by means of elimination of non-tariff barriers and 
rules that limit adoptions of discretionary and arbitrary measures (See Saez [1999], p.166).   
  Although factors behind the new trade policy were different between Mexico and 
Chile, they coincided in considering that FTA was one of the important policy instruments as 
early as the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, it was not just an accident that the pioneering 
bilateral trade liberalization was agreed between these two countries. The first Chile-Mexico 
trade agreement w ent into force in January 1992, almost two years before NAFTA was 
established. The agreement was officially called ECA 17 (Economic  Complementarity 
Agreement) of ALADI (Latin American Integration Association, LAIA). One year before 
Mexico-Chile ECA was ratified, Argentine-Chile ECA went into force, which was called ECA 
16 of ALADI. These two  ECAs as well as many  other trade agreements  among Latin 
American countries were negotiated in the framework of ALADI. Therefore the existence of 
ALADI, as a kind of “umbrella” agreement notified to GATT, facilitated considerably the 
negotiation and realization of these  regional trade agreements. Since, under this type 
agreement, trade in goods is liberalized either partially or fully according to the provisions set 
forth in ALADI’s 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, ECA under ALADI framework can be regarded 
as a sort of FTA in many cases. However it should be mentioned that, just because of the 
agreements in the ALADI framework, their scope was very limited compared with such a 
comprehensive FTA as NAFTA that has detailed rules of origins and well formalized 
provisions on dispute settlement, service, intellectual property, investment, and government 
procurement.   
Hence these first ECAs of Latin American countries ratified at the beginning of the 
1990s are often called a simple scheme of FTA. As a matter of fact, ECAs basically cover 
trade of goods although they contemplate possibilities of future negotiation of other areas. 
They included general trade rules and dispositions regarding dispute settlements that, however, 
are not considered very effective. 
 
(2) Second phase: “Deepening and widening” of FTAs. 
 
  The so-called comprehensive FTAs are substantially different from simple FTAs, 
particularly, in terms of trade of services, investments, dispute settlements and antidumping.
3   
                                        
3 Some authors consider the comprehensive FTAs a la NAFTA as “third generation” or “last 
generation” FTAs. In Chile, an ECA with liberalization under negative list is called first generation 
FTA, an  ECA with liberalization under positive list is called second generation FTA, and a   8 
  As it was mentioned above, the announcement of Presidents Bush and Salinas on the 
initiative on bilateral trade agreement was made June 1990, soon after Canada-United States 
Free Trade Agreement went into force (1989).  It was thought that Mexico-United States 
FTA could jeopardize to some extent the Canada’s advantage gained by the Canada-US FTA.  
Hence Canada decided to participate in the negotiation to eventually attain the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. The trilateral talks started in 1991.     
  The three countries’ stances towards NAFTA and interests behind it are very different.  
We have to recognize that the long history of Canada-US and Mexico-US economic relations 
as well as several formal and informal arrangements existed prior to the negotiation of 
NAFTA between these pairs of countries were important elements that explain the 
comprehensive nature of the NAFTA. For instance, the agreement on trade of automobiles 
between Canada and United States and the regime for “ Maquiladoras” in the Mexico-US 
border zone can be important elements for the comprehensive nature of NAFTA, although we 
do not have enough space to discuss in details this important aspect (See Molot [1996], 
pp.317-35). 
  As far as Mexico is concerned, the specific reasons, among others, which motivated 
the country to negotiate comprehensive FTAs, especially NAFTA, are considered to be 
following: 
  (a) As Mexico was to liberalize trade and investment anyway, it was considered to be 
beneficial for the country to get concessions through the trade agreement from the United 
States, the largest trade partner for Mexico.   
  (b) As the percentage of petroleum in the total export of Mexico had been decreasing 
rapidly, it was convenient for Mexico to get better access to as many markets as possible 
through bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations. 
  (c) It was considered also very important to assure the continuity of economic policy 
of opening that started from mid 1980s. It was thought that NAFTA would make it much more 
difficult for the future governments of Mexico to change this liberalization policy through so 
called “locking-in” effect (See Leycegui [2000], pp.31-2). 
As for Chile, liberalization through bilateral FTAs was getting to be considered one 
of the most effective instruments of trade policy for a small country like Chile. According to 
Sebastian Saez, former Director in charge of trade negotiation of Chilean Foreign Ministry 
(DIRECON), multilateral system of trade has certain rules of negotiation that affects the 
                                                                                                                          
comprehensive FTA like NAFTA is called third generation FTA or last generation FTA (TLC de ultima 
generacion). However, agreement between Chile and MERCOSUR is considered different from 
above-mentioned FTAs, because it covers articles related to matters as physical integration, border 
trade, etc. although does not cover several normative issues included in the last generation FTAs as 
second Chile-Mexico FTA and Canada-Chile FTA. See Saez [1999], p.164.   9 
capacity of negotiation of small countries. As a small country is not the relevant producer of a 
certain product in the world, the space for negotiation for her is limited due to the rule of the 
principal supplier of GATT (See Saez [1999], pp.166-7). 
The first comprehensive FTA for Chile was Canada-Chile FTA, which went into 
force in 1997. According to Saez, from the period of negotiation of this FTA, Chile’s basic 
stance regarding FTAs have changed, reflecting interest of Chile to include aspects related to 
investments and services in the FTAs. At the same time, Chile looked for more solid judicial 
security through a reliable system of dispute settlement (See Saez [1999], pp.173-4). 
After the NAFTA was established, Mexico extended FTAs to several countries of 
Latin America. In 1995, the trilateral FTA with Colombia and Venezuela was negotiated to 
form the G3 (el Gupo de los Tres). FTAs with Costa Rica and Bolivia went into force in l995 
and FTA with Nicaragua in 1998 and later the negotiation on FTAs with three other countries 
of Central America together, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; individually with Panama, 
Ecuador, Peru, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominican Republic and Israel followed. 
In this process, the renegotiation of Chile-Mexico ECA was particularly important.  
The interests of these two countries coincided again in the sense that for both of them it was 
convenient to up-grade the former simple ECA and transform it into a comprehensive NAFTA 
type FTA. The comprehensive Chile-Mexico FTA started in July 1999. 
In the case of Chile, after the first two trade agreements (ECA  with Argentina and 
Mexico, respectively, as mentioned above), the country  started free trade agreements in 
ALADI framework (ECA) with Venezuela and Bolivia in 1993, Colombia in 1994, Ecuador in 
1995, MERCOSUR in 1996, and Peru in 1998. Chile also initiated bilateral negotiation with 
Canada from 1996 and with Central American Common Market from 1999. 
In this way, Mexico and Chile have been converting into “hubs” of FTAs in Latin 
America from mid 1990s. At the same time they have made efforts to deepen the contents of 
FTAs from simple schemes to a comprehensive one during this period. 
 
(3) Third phase: Inter-regional FTAs   
 
Towards the end of 1990s, both Mexico and Chile started to look for establishing 
FTAs with extra-regional countries. As they are the most recent initiatives, they are not yet 
necessarily analyzed in depth. However, it could not be denied that they reflect the new trade 
policy of these countries and their intentions to diversify economic ties with major 
extra-regional countries like European Union and Asia. In this context,  it is expected that 
Mexico and Chile are going to be “hubs” that involves not only FTAs in Latin American, but 
also inter-regional FTAs connecting existing or newly establishing integration schemes among   10 
Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia. 
One of the basic reasons for this tendency towards FTA  with other countries or 
regions than Latin America lies in the natural outcomes from above mentioned deepening and 
widening process of FTA, particularly the proliferation of bilateral FTAs. However, Mexico 
and Chile have different reasons for expanding their FTAs with extra-regional countries.   
After the entry into force of NAFTA, the Mexican export had increased dramatically 
from $51.9 billion to $136.9 billion during 1993 to 1999. But the extent of dependency on the 
US market also had boosted considerably. In 1999, about 88% of Mexican export went to the 
US, while that to EU was only 3.3%. Even though the trade expansion with the US must be 
welcome for Mexico, too much dependence on the US market would make  the Mexican 
economy very  vulnerable to fluctuations of the US economy. Moreover  extremely close 
relationship with the US may weaken Mexican political influence to its southern neighbors. 
Therefore it will be desirable for Mexico to diversify and strengthen economic relations with 
extra-regions through expanding bilateral FTAs. In fact, Mexico initiated bilateral 
negotiations with the countries of extra-regions from the mid 1990s. Mexico concluded the 
negotiation with EU in December 1999 and the EU-Mexico FTA itself came in effective from 
July 2000. 
Chile is one of the most liberalized countries in the world. In fact, Chile has pursued 
unilateral trade liberalization with uniform tariff rates that have been reduced 1% each year (it 
is scheduled to reduce to 6% by 2003). Uniform tariff means that any sector  is neither 
preferential nor protected and there is no sensitive sector at the negotiation for FTA. With 
such  openness of the  economy, regional agreement is an effective measure for Chile to 
accelerate trade liberalization of partner countries. Therefore Chile has sought to improve 
market access for its export by negotiating a series of regional schemes such as FTA, ECA 
and AIP (Agreement for Investment Protection) with hemispheric and non-hemispheric 
trading partners. Chile-EU framework agreement for cooperation looking towards a FTA was 
accorded in 1999. In this context, it was also very important for Chile to start Chile-US FTA 
negotiation from the end of 2000. 
  At the same time, Latin America  countries seem to have been increasing their 
interests to extend bilateral FTAs to Asian countries. Mexico and Chile, in particular, are 
showing strong interests in forming bilateral framework with Japan, Korea, and Singapore. A 
couple of studies on the possibilities of Japan-Mexico FTA and Japan-Chile FTA have been 
made in these countries. Moreover preliminary consultation or negotiation between each of 
these two Latin American countries and some Asian countries such as Korea and Singapore 
are also being made.   
  It should be noted here that these momentum in Latin America towards bilateral FTA   11 
would have significant influences on the recent movements in Asia for forming bilateral FTA. 
If Asian countries pay enough attention on Latin America, initiatives for bilateral FTA in Asia 
Pacific would be accelerated.   
 
 
4.  Present Economic Relations between Asia and Latin America   
 
It will be useful to overview the present economic relations between Latin America 
and Asia before turning into the questions of perspectives regarding Japanese FTAs with Latin 
American countries.   
 
(1) Trade 
One of the prominent changes in trade in the 1990s is seen in drastic increase of 
intra-regional trade in every region. As Table 3 shows, NAFTA increased its share of 
intra-regional trade from 41.4% in 1990 to 51.0% in 1998, and Latin America (except 
Mexico) from 13.7% to 31.4% in the same period. East Asia also increased the intra-regional 
trade from 35.7% in 1990 to 43.4% in 1997, but it decreased slightly due to currency crisis in 
1998. As mentioned above, one of the basic reasons for the increase in intra-regional trade in 
Latin America can be attributed to the developments of institutional regional integration such 
as MERCOSUR and various bilateral FTAs, while in East Asia the increase of intra-regional 
trade has mainly been attributable to “de facto” expansion of trade led by market.   
The share of Latin America in total East Asian exports has been stable at the level 
around 2% or 3%, which shows a rather moderate importance of Latin America for East Asia. 
Since “East Asia” in this figure includes Japan, it is likely that the East Asian countries other 
than Japan must have much less export to Latin America. By contrast, the share of East Asia 
in total Latin American exports has been keeping about 10% indicating that the importance of 
East Asia for Latin America is much greater. There is an apparent asymmetry in the 
importance as an export market for respective region. 
From the theory of international trade, both regions have a similar structure of 
“comparative advantage”, which means that their trade is competing. The geographic distance 
also has been discouraging trade between the regions. But industrial developments in both 
regions, particularly in the manufacturing sector, have a possibility to expand “intra-industrial 
trade” between the regions, though it will take a long time. At the same time, even though the 
structure of comparative advantage may not change in the short run, economic liberalization 
can change in product varieties and qualities (differentiation), which can provide a large 
chance to expand trade between Asia and Latin America. In this sense, some regional   12 
agreements is expected to be an effective measure to expand the inter-regional trade between 
Asia and Latin America. 
 
(2) Foreign Direct Investment 
Asian countries have received FDI at an increasing rate by 1997, but slightly 
stagnated in 1998 and 1999 because of the currency crisis in 1997 (See Figure 3). By contrast, 
FDI to Latin America has kept an increasing pace by 1999, despite the currency crisis in 
Brazil in 1999 (See Figure 2). In 1999, FDI flowed into Latin America about US$90 and in 
Asia about US$62. The reasons for recent different patterns of FDI in these regions are (1) 
privatizations in Latin America explains about 30% of FDI inflows, (2) Japanese recession 
reduced its FDI into Asia, and (3) the effects of currency crisis was much grater in Asia than 
Latin America. But, one conspicuous reason to explain an increasing FDI into Latin America 
lies in the aggressive investments and M&A of the US and European multinationals that are 
regarding Latin America as an important future market with expanding network by various 
regional integration. Particularly Spanish multinationals such as Telefónica de España, 
Endesa-Eapaña, Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya have invested in Latin American 
countries very aggressively. The total FDI into Latin America from Spain has increased from 
US$4,024 mil in 1996 to US$12,636 in 1998.   
According to the MOF data about Japanese FDI, Japan had increased continuously 
its FDI into Asia by 1997, but dropped in 1998 and 1999 due to the Asian crisis and domestic 
financial  instability. By contrast, the share of Latin America in total Japanese FDI has been 
increasing (See Figure 5). But, by taking a closer look at the figures, it becomes clear that a 
major part of the FDI in Latin America went into Caiman Island, Bermuda, and Panama in 
order to make good use of tax heaven and flag convenience. This means the Japanese FDI into 
Latin America in the area of manufacturing and service sectors is very small (about 2.2% of 
the total Japanese FDI in 1998 and 5.5% in 1999). On the other hand, the US has kept FDI in 
Latin America at the stable level, for instance 14.1% of total US FDI in 1999. Reflecting these 
facts, the Japanese presence in Latin America has been declining rapidly. The basics reason 
for this is seen in the fact that a major part of FDI into Latin America occurred in such area as 
privatization, telecommunication, electricity, energy, IT, etc. These are areas that Japan does 
not have international competitiveness. Besides, the recent FDI takes the form of M&A that 
the Japanese firms do not have enough experiences and advantages. This fact tells us that 
Japan is losing its international  competitiveness in Latin American market, and should 
progress structural reforms more quickly and to more extent. 
Taking consideration of these facts regarding Japanese trade and FDI to Latin 
America, it would be helpful to examine the prospects for FTAs with Latin American   13 
countries as effective measures to strengthen economic ties between Japan and Latin America.   
 
 
5. Perspectives for Japan-Mexico and Japan-Chile FTA 
   
In this section, we will focus on new initiatives that are being taken to strengthen 
economic relations between East Asia and Latin America: among others, initiatives towards 
bilateral FTAs such as Japan-Mexico FTA and Japan-Chile FTA. 
    In the section 3, efforts were made to identify motivations of some Latin American 
countries to strengthen their external relations through FTAs. Further more it was explained 
that in recent years they became to be highly interested in establishing FTAs with 
extra-regional countries such as EU and Japan. 
  Therefore, in this section we need to examine, first, factors which motivate East 
Asian countries, especially Japan, to get interested in strengthening ties with Latin American 
countries through FTAs in order to assess, later, the perspectives of Japan-Mexico FTA and 
Japan-Chile FTA, having also in mind the analysis of previous sections (especially sections 
2,3 and 4).   
 
(1) Basic Factors behind  initiatives towards bilateral FTAs between some East Asian and 
Latin American countries. 
 
We could distinguish at least two basic factors for Japan to get much more motivated 
now to consider the possibilities of establishing FTAs with some of Latin American countries 
almost at the same time with the establishment of FTAs with some East Asian countries: one 
is recognition of the importance of FTAs in general terms and the other is the concern about 
the eventual discrimination against Japan vis-à-vis United States and EU in some of Latin 
American countries. 
As for the first point, we can recognize that in several East Asian countries, including 
Japan, Korea and Singapore, a positive view of bilateral or regional FTAs (as well as of 
sub-regional cooperation) is now much more broadly held than a few years ago. Indeed, Japan 
and Korea, the last two significant contracting parties of the GATT/WTO that have never 
participated in a formal FTA or regional integration process on the grounds that these process 
are against multilateralism, have recently changed their attitude to FTAs. 
Note, for example, that the 1999 edition of the White Paper on External Trade issued   14 
by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
4 declared, for the first time. 
For instance, MITI showed its clear stance in White Paper [1999], pp.37-8.   
“Japan, convinced of the importance of consistency with the principles of GATT, and 
considering the possible negative effects of regional integration on regional and extra-regional 
countries, has thus far adopted a very different position from that of most other countries of 
the world, which have promoted regional integration (FTAs and customs unions) in addition 
to the multilateral trading system.”   
“Nevertheless, there i s a growing need to address this issue in a more flexible and 
constructive manner, since the following positive effects of regional integration are evident 
and they could help to strengthen the multilateral trading system. First, there has been a net 
growth of trade and investment in the specific cases of NAFTA and MERCOSUR. Second, in 
the context of globalization, some rules of the international economy have been fixed by 
means of the harmonization of many national circumstances. It should therefore be easier to 
establish rules (such as TRIMs, TRIPs, dispute settlement, government procurement etc.) 
among countries with similar socio-economic conditions. Third, in negotiating the multilateral 
system of international trade, a greater role is now played by groups of countries engaged in 
regional integration or cooperation.” 
The White Paper concluded: “Japan should assume a more active posture towards 
regional integration and cooperation initiatives, and should propose a model that will help 
strengthen the multilateral system.” 
Less than a year after, the Trade and Investment Committee of Keidanren (The 
Federation of Economic Organizations of Japan) published the report Free Trade Agreement 
should be strongly promoted: Towards a new approach of trade policy and handed it over to 
the government in July, 2000.  This report made a comprehensive analysis regarding the 
urgent need for Japan to promote FTAs and proposed the scope and contents of the expected 
FTAs including trade of services, rules of origin, anti-dumping measures, safeguard, 
liberalization and protection of foreign direct investment, standards and certification, 
intellectual property rights, government procurement, competition policy, electronic 
commerce, and dispute settlement. 
We should add that in this new context, Japan and Singapore started negotiations for 
a “New Age FTA” from the beginning of 2001. This will cover several issues related to 
electronic commerce and information technology, in addition to the comprehensive trade and 
investment areas (a comprehensive FTA).
5 
                                        
4 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, was reorganized in the process of administrative 
reform and since January 2001 it is called Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, METI. 
5 In this connection, we should mention also that during his visit to Japan in October 1998, the   15 
As for the second point mentioned above, Japan, Korea and other East Asian 
countries are now increasingly more convinced of the need to strengthen its links and 
cooperation with Latin America, since North American and European countries are already 
moving in that direction. Indeed, for example, East Asian countries substantially lag behind 
the United States, Canada and European countries in their foreign direct investment in Latin 
America, in which market East Asian firms are in a disadvantageous position in term of 
competition in the area of trade and investment against the US and EU firms.   
There are of course various explanations for this. Attention must nevertheless be paid 
to the fact that in comparison with the United States (which has taken the lead in the FTAA 
discussions) and the EU (which concluded a FTA with Mexico in 2000 and is negotiating a 
FTA with MERCOSUR as well as with Chile under the terms of an existing framework 
agreements), thus far there have been no similar initiatives between Latin America and East 
Asian countries, including Japan.
6 
In addition to this, it should be mentioned that Latin America has been always 
important for Japan, Korea and other East Asian countries because of its abundant resources 
of minerals and foodstuffs. 
Finally, as a specific reason for Japan, it should be stressed that comprehensive FTA 
with any countries would have a possibility to accelerate structural adjustments of Japanese 
economy that has suffered from the serious recession for a decade because of the sluggish 
reforms.   
 
(2) The initiative for Japan-Mexico FTA and specific factors behind it 
 
Responding to the proposal of the President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo formulated 
during his visit to Japan in November 1998 that efforts to consider concrete measures to 
strengthen economic relations between Mexico and Japan should be initiated, Japan External 
                                                                                                                          
President of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jun, proposed a new bilateral relationship between 
Korea and Japan that is suited to the new era. The two governments have agreed to set up a study 
committee in each country, entrusted with considering measures to strengthen their economic links. 
During his visit to Korea in March 1999, Keizo Obuchi, then Prime Minister of Japan, presented the 
“Agenda 21 of the Japan-Korea Economy: Towards Stronger Japanese-Korean Economic Relations in 
the Twenty-first Century” 
 
6 It was in this context that Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, proposed the creation of the 
East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) during a visit to Chile in October 1998. EALAF seeks to 
bring together the leaders of the Asian and Latin American countries with the aim of fostering dialogue 
on trade and investment. EALAF’s first meeting of senior officials was held in September 1999, and 
another followed in August 2000. The first ministerial meeting is scheduled for the first quarter of 
2001 in Chile.   16 
Trade Organization, JETRO established a Commission to study on measures to strengthen 
economic relations between Japan and Mexico in February 1999 and presented its report in 
April 2000. The  Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development  (SECOFI) of Mexican 
government also presented its report at the same time.   
The above-mentioned Commission of JETRO summarized as follows the conclusion 
of its study:
7   
“A FTA would be an effective means of strengthening economic ties 
between Japan and Mexico.” 
  “The Promotion of a Japan-Mexico FTA would not only contribute to the 
establishment of trade and investment rules in multilateral negotiations at the WTO, for 
instance, but also play a major role in diversifying Japan’s trade policy options and in 
preventing the formation of regional economic blocs in North America, Europe and Asia” 
  “In promoting a Japan-Mexico FTA, an initiative should be taken also to seek a more 
comprehensive, higher-level agreement that will cover not only trade and investment 
liberalization but also intellectual property rights, standards certification, government 
procurement, and dispute settlement mechanisms.  At the same time, even while giving 
adequate consideration to possible effects on domestic industries, every effort should be made 
to create a basic framework to realize a FTA at the earliest date possible.” 
  This report emphasizes, among others, the following important points:  (a) 
Japan-Mexico FTA should be comprehensive, (b) its effects on domestic industries, especially 
agriculture, should be taken into consideration
8, and (c) interregional FTA like the eventual 
Japan-Mexico FTA would avoid the formation of major blocks in the world economy.      
  Japan-Mexico Economic Committee of Keidanren is much more specific regarding 
the urgent need of negotiating the FTA with Mexico. The President of the Committee, Mr. 
Nobuhiko Kawamoto emphasizes the importance of Japan-Mexico FTA on the base of the 
recent survey of Japan-Mexico Chamber of Commerce (established in Mexico).   
According to this survey, about 80% of Japanese firms which are operating in 
Mexico think that there is a demerit of not forming FTA with Mexico, for the reasons: (1) 
Mexican tariff rate increased about 3% for the imports from non-FTA countries from January 
1999, (2) Special treatments by Maquiradora and PITEX
9 would be abolished by the end of 
                                        
7  JETRO,2000, p.45 
8 The report mentions in details the possible effects on agriculture and livestock, especially on the 
production of pork in Japan.   
9 On May 3, 1990, the president of Mexico enacted the "Decree Establishing Temporary Import 
Programs to Produce Export Articles" ("PITEX"). The purpose of PITEX is to promote exports of 
non-petroleum products, vertical integration, and sales of export quality products in the Mexican 
domestic market. A company seeking to work under PITEX must obtain authorization from the   17 
2000, (3) Japanese firms are in an unfavorable condition in the competition of  government 
procurements and privatized infra-projects comparing with FTA member countries due to the 
tariffs levied on imports from Japan. In particular, Japanese electronic and transportation 
firms in Mexico have a strong demand for creating FTA with Mexico. 
Moreover 72 per cent of the above-mentioned firms replied that the recently 
established EU-Mexico FTA would have negative impacts on them.   
In short, Keidanren is overwhelmingly concerned of the discrimination against Japan 
caused by NAFTA and EU-Mexico FTA.
10 
Very recently (January 23, 2001), Japan and Mexico agreed to materialize an 
Investment Protection Agreement within three months as a preparation for FTA, and also 
agreed to form a study committee for strengthening economic relationship. 
 
(3) The initiative for Japan-Chile FTA and specific factors behind 
 
In November 1999, Mr. Gabriel Valdes, Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile, 
manifested to Mr. Noboru Hatakeyama, President of the Japan External Trade Organization, 
JETRO, his hope to carry out a study on the possibilities of signing a Japan-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement. Then, in February 2000, the Undersecretary of the same Ministry in charge of 
economic relations proposed officially to JETRO to start the study. 
In order to respond to this proposal, the JETRO established a Study Committee on 
Japan-Chile Free Trade Agreement in May 2000. This Committee finally published its report 
in May 2001, concluding as follows
11  : 
“Having duly considered the advantages and disadvantages of a free trade agreement 
between Japan and Chile, and having adequately considered the potential impact on Japan’s 
specific domestic industries
12, the multifaceted role of agriculture, and the need to secure a 
stable supply of natural resources, we conclude that the maximum effort should be made to 
conclude a free trade agreement between Japan and Chile as soon as possible.” 
“For all of these reasons, the free trade agreement to be concluded between Japan 
and Chile should be comprehensive, addressing not only market access but also investments, 
services, government procurement, standards and certification, and competition policies. In 
this way, it will not only promote bilateral trade but also promote mutual investment flows 
                                                                                                                          
Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI)" 
10 Opinions expressed by Mr. Kawamoto are those  published by the magazine of Keidanren. See 
Keidaren, (a monthly journal of the organization of the same name), October 2000 (in Japanese). 
11  JETRO, 2001, p.16   
12 Impacts on agiculture and fishery, particularly salmon, are widely referred in the report.   18 
and encourage businesses from the two nations to cooperate in developing markets in third 
countries. In addition, as a result of the agreement’s motivational effect, Japan and Chile will 
enter into a closer and more multilevel economic relationship. Not only that, by concluding a 
forward-looking free-trade agreement demonstrating that both nations regard free trade as a 
matter of national policy, Japan and Chile will be contributing to the liberalization of trade 
and investment throughout the world.”   
Although the general background for taking initiatives towards Japan-Chile FTA is 
same as Japan-Mexico FTA, there are some specific aspects which are different between them.  
First of all, the discrimination against Japan vis-à-vis the United States and EU is potential 
one in the case of Chile, because Chile-US FTA and Chile-EU FTA are now being negotiated, 
while NAFTA and EU-Mexico FTA are already in force.   
Second, trade between Japan and Chile and Japanese investments in Chile are much 
less than the case of Japan-Mexico relations. However, in the case of Chile, the following 
aspects are emphasized as reasons for studying the possibilities of Japan-Chile FTA: (a) Chile 
model of economic development, (b) Chile’s free trade policy,  (c) advanced status in IT 
among Latin American countries and (d) Chile’s position as a “gateway” between Asia and 
the rest of Latin America, especially, MERCOSUR. On the base of these aspects, the report 
emphasizes that Chile is important to Japan as a partner of FTA. 
 
(4) Possibilities and significance of Japan-Mexico FTA and Japan-Chile FTA: Preliminary 
Remarks 
 
As the initiatives towards Japan-Mexico FTA and Japan-Chile FTA are still at an 
early phase, we are not in conditions to make an in-depth analysis to assess the possibilities of 
these agreements.  However, we could mention at least the following factors as crucial for 
them:   
(a) Concern about the discrimination against Japan vis-à-vis the United States, 
Canada and EU in Latin American countries, especially in the Mexican and Chilean markets, 
as well as the increasingly stronger negative impacts of this situation on Japanese trade and 
investment in these countries;   
(b) Possibilities for avoiding or alleviating potential impacts of these FTAs on 
domestic industries such as agriculture, livestock and fishery through several domestic policy 
measures and/or instruments as well as through specific approaches and modalities in the 
context of FTA themselves, such as those adopted in the EU-Mexico FTA, which are 
considered to be consistent with GATT/WTO 
(c) WTO negotiation on agricultural sector and the stance of Japanese government   19 
for further liberalization in this sector having mind her strong concern about the multi-faceted 
role of agriculture including issues of environment and food security. 
(d) Process of negotiation of Japan-Singapore FTA and other related initiatives in 
Asia. 
(e) Advancement of other interregional FTAs initiatives between East Asian and 
Latin American countries such as Chile-Korea FTA and Singapore-Mexico FTA.   
(f) Advancement of negotiations to establish FTAA in the Western Hemisphere and 
negotiations for EU-MERCOSUR FTA. In this regard, it is considered crucial whether the 
Bush Administration would be able to obtain the authorization of the fast track for trade 
negotiation by the Congress. 
As was mentioned before, it is too early to evaluate this on-going process of 
interregional FTA initiatives. Nevertheless, we believe that this paper could have contributed 
to identify basic motivations behind them and some crucial factors that would determine the 
possibilities of attaining these FTAs actually in near future. 
It is conspicuous that bilateral FTA with Mexico and Chile will be very helpful as a 
steppingstone for expanding the relationship between Japan and Latin America. Taking 
account of a fact that the Japanese presence in Latin America in terms of FDI has declined in 
the 1990s, bilateral FTA with Latin American countries will have a special importance for 
Japan to promote Japanese FDI not only in the member countries but also in other Latin 
American countries that are integrated through various regional schemes. In addition, it 
should be underlined that discussions about FTA with Mexico and Chile themselves will have 
a great influence on the initiatives for bilateral FTAs in Asia and on the APEC liberalization 
process (Mexico and Chile are the APEC members). Of course, it also should be noted that 
such FTAs must be endowed with some mechanism that guarantee a contribution to 
multilateral liberalization, or at least should not be contradictory to it. Such FTAs should not 
be  protective against the third  countries and should have a clear condition regarding 
participation.   
 
6. New Initiatives to Cooperation between East Asia and Latin America 
 
In addition to the initiatives for bilateral FTAs, Asian and Latin American countries 
have embarked on a new framework to enhance the connections between the two regions. As 
a first step for this new approach, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, in October 1998, 
proposed the formation of a summit to bring together the leaders of Asian, including Japan, 
and Latin American countries. It is called the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF, in 
Spanish, FALAE). The first Meeting of EALAF was held on September 1 to 3, 1999 in   20 
Singapore. 
The inaugural Ministerial Meeting of the Forum  was held in Santiago, Chile on 29 
and 30 March 2001.  In this meeting, it was agreed that the official name of the forum will 
be “Forum for East Asia – Latin America Cooperation.” (FEALAC) 
The participant countries at the Singapore Meeting were China, South Korea, Japan, 
ASEAN 10 countries of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam),  Australia, New Zealand and 12 
countries from Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico) (See Table 4). At the inaugural FEALAC 
meeting, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Cuba were accepted as member countries.  Thus, one 
of the salient futures of this Forum lies in a fact that almost all the Latin American countries 
are joining it, while only three countries from Latin America are participating to APEC. Asia 
is linked to North America through APEC, and also has a dialogue channel with Europe 
through ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). In this sense, it is expected that the FEALAC could 
be a forum that boosts Asia-Latin American ties and forges the missing link between two 
regions.   
According to the Communique of the above-mentioned Santiago Meeting, it marked 
the beginning of an unprecedented dialogue and cooperation between their regions to meet 
political, cultural, social, economic and international issues of common concern.  In this 
connection, they will strengthen the ties between their two dynamic regions that will need to 
manage the challenges and opportunities in an interdependent and globalised world.   
During the Meeting, the Ministers approved the Framework Document of the Forum 
that establishes the principles, aims, objectives and modalities to guide its future work.  They 
also decided to establish three Working Groups, with the aim of strengthening dialogue and 
cooperation in political/cultural, economic/social, and education/science and technology 
fields. 
  The FEALAC Framework establishes that the purpose of the Forum is to promote 
better understanding, political and economic dialogue and cooperation in all areas so as to 
achieve more effective and fruitful relations and closer cooperation between the two regions. 
It also mentions that the Forum should take a multidisciplinary approach and could involve 
both the public and private sectors. 
It should be pointed out that FEALAC will  have to address several issues in the 
future: (1) the relation with the United States that does not participate in it, and (2) the relation 
with APEC that has similar objectives and overlaps the membership. At the moment, we have 
not any information related to the United States’ official stance regarding the FEALAC. 
Regarding APEC, according to a Chilean high official, “APEC has nothing to do with this   21 
forum. It’s an economic and commercial forum. We will take up social, cultural and political 
issues. Political issues are very important to us.”   
If this FEALAC concept gets off the ground, the two regions, which have a 
combined population of 2.3 billion people, will have a framework for economic dialogue for 
the first time that would play an important role for the future relationship between the regions. 
According to the Co-Chairs’ Statement of the above-mentioned Santiago Ministerial 
Meeting, the Ministers directed that the Working Groups would have the following broad 
terms of reference: 
a) Elaborate detailed frameworks for cooperation between the two regions in order to 
make recommendations on a few practical, Forum-wide projects; 
b) In doing so, the Working Groups should, where appropriate, endeavor to 
coordinate and harmonize existing national projects and explore potential 
synergies between national projects and proposed Forum-wide projects in order to 
identify national projects which could be harmonized with, or incorporated into, 
possible Forum-wide projects;   
c) The Working Groups should also examine suggestions made by member states in           
order to prioritize them and avoid duplication with the existing work of other  




  Thus far East Asian countries, including Japan, have been pursuing multilateralism 
under GATT/WTO regime and have realized “market oriented” regional integration. However 
it is becoming conspicuous that the formal regional integration does not necessarily contradict 
with multilateralism, rather it could be an effective  measure for trade and investment 
liberalization. Moreover, because of drastic progress of regionalism in the world, East Asian 
countries have been forced to be in disadvantageous positions regarding competition in the 
markets of formal integration. It is an inevitable result that the East Asian countries recently 
initiated negotiations with various countries about FTAs. 
  In this context, bilateral FTAs with Latin American countries have exceedingly 
important meanings for Asian countries. Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and 
Chile, have rich experiences in forming bilateral FTAs and strong concerns about FTA with 
East Asia. As Mexico-EU FTA indicates, they have already entered into the third phase of 
regional integration, and are looking for new FTAs with extra-regions. Taking account of the   
merits of bilateral FTA discussed in the previous section, the strong driving force of Mexico 
and Chile towards FTA seem to produce circumstances in which  the initiatives in Asian   22 
countries for FTA would be accelerated. 
  Using bilateral FTAs as a lever, it is expected that Asia and Latin American countries 
would be able to promote trade and investment liberalization, and then could amend the 
missing link  between the regions. For Japan, FTA means not only strengthening  the 
connections with Latin America but also effective stimulus for structural adjustments in the 
domestic economy. In  this sense, Japan, in  particular, must take a leadership and proceed 
actively the negotiations for FTAs with Latin American countries. Finally it is needless to say 
that Japan should pursue and construct FTA that is consistent with  multilateral free trade 
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 Table 2 Effective Regional Arrangements of Chile, Mexico and MERCOSUR 
  Participant Country or Region  Type   Effectuation 
Chile  Bolivia  ECA  July 1, 1993 
  Venezuela  ECA  July 1, 1993 
  Colombia  ECA  January 1, 1994 
  Ecuador  ECA  January 1, 1995 
  MERCOSUR  ECA  October 1, 1996 
  Canada  FTA  July 5, 1997 
  Peru  ECA  July 1, 1998 
  European Union  CFA  April 24, 1999 
  Mexico  FTA  August 1, 1999 
  USA  FTA  Under Negotiation 
  Korea  FTA  Under Negotiation 
  Central America  FTA  Under Negotiation 
  Cuba  FTA  Under Negotiation 
Mexico  US, Canada (NAFTA)  FTA    January 1, 1994 
  Colombia, Venezuela (G3)  FTA    January 1, 1995 
  Bolivia  FTA  Januray 1, 1995 
  Costa Rica  FTA  Januray 1, 1995 
  Nicaragua  FTA  July 1, 1998 
  EU  FTA  July 1, 2000 
  Chile  FTA  August 1, 1999 
  Israel  FTA  July 1, 2000 
  Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador  (Northern Triangle) 
FTA    January 1, 2001 
  EFTA  FTA  July 1, 2001 
  Uruguay  ECA  Effective 
  Peru  ECA  Effective 
  Argentina  ECA  Effective 
  Brazil  ECA  Effective 
  Ecuador  FTA  Under negotiation 
  Peru  FTA  Under negotiation 
  Panama  FTA  Under negotiation 
  Trinidad y Tobago  FTA  Under negotiation 
  Japan  IPA  Under negotiation 
MERCOSUR  EU  CFA(FTA 2005)  Dec. 1995 (sighed) 
  Bolivia  ECA  January 1, 1996 
  Chile  ECA  October 1, 1996 
  CACM  CFA  April 18, 1998(signed) 
  ANDES  CFA  April 18, 1998(signed) 
  South Africa  FTA  Under negotiation 
Notes: FTA: Free Trade Agreement, ECA: Economic Complementarity Agreement,   
CFA: Cooperation Framework Agreement, IPA: Investment Protection Agreement. 
Source: Mexico: Secretaria de Economia, Chile: DIRECON, Mercosur: Mercosur Committee   
in Uruguay.     25 
Table 3.  Intra and Inter-Regional Trade Share by Each Region (%) 




region                   
NAFTA  NAFTA  0.360 0.346 0.336 0.439 0.414 0.462 0.476 0.491 0.510
 
Latin 
America  0.081 0.089 0.086 0.056 0.048 0.067 0.067 0.071 0.073
  East Asia  0.176 0.152 0.168 0.147 0.187 0.202 0.200 0.181 0.152
  EU  0.233 0.195 0.216 0.170 0.196 0.162 0.154 0.154 0.164
  Oceania.  0.022 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015




America  0.112 0.119 0.169 0.119 0.152 0.261 0.274 0.284 0.314
  NAFTA  0.322 0.338 0.287 0.332 0.350 0.270 0.289 0.292 0.283
  East Asia  0.054 0.048 0.063 0.065 0.088 0.115 0.109 0.099 0.083
  EU  0.332 0.268 0.214 0.257 0.241 0.231 0.211 0.193 0.194
  Oceania.  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
                     
East Asia    East Asia  0.287 0.286 0.327 0.318 0.357 0.390 0.435 0.434 0.384
  NAFTA  0.325 0.235 0.235 0.334 0.280 0.240 0.233 0.238 0.263
 
Latin 
America  0.037 0.060 0.047 0.028 0.018 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.027
  EU  0.135 0.134 0.144 0.114 0.162 0.137 0.121 0.135 0.140
  Oceania.  0.034 0.034 0.028 0.070 0.022 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.027
                     
EU  NAFTA  0.097 0.069 0.067 0.112 0.082 0.077 0.079 0.086 0.096
 
Latin 
America  0.031 0.035 0.033 0.018 0.012 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023
  East Asia  0.033 0.029 0.031 0.041 0.051 0.072 0.073 0.007 0.110
  EU  0.487 0.484 0.509 0.503 0.550 0.624 0.614 0.558 0.561
  Oceania.  0.016 0.012 0.028 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
                     
Oceania  NAFTA  0.169 0.134 0.144 0.128 0.135 0.089 0.088 0.097 0.118
 
Latin 
America  0.007 0.019 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.016
  East Asia  0.326 0.391 0.385 0.408 0.443 0.509 0.456 0.482 0.431
  EU  0.247 0.173 0.141 0.131 0.121 0.117 0.115 0.102 0.132
  Oceania.  0.061 0.061 0.064 0.070 0.076 0.099 0.097 0.095 0.083
Notes: NAFTA (US, Canada, Mexico),   Latin America(excludes Mexico),   
East Asia (Japan, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,   
Singapore. Thailand; exclude Taiwan), Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) 
Source: DOT/IMF. 
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Table 4 East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAS/FALAE): Participating Countries 






East Asia       
Australia  19.0  380.0  20,540 
Brunei  0.3  7.1  25,090 
Cambodia  11.0  0.3  300 
China  1,227.0  1,055.4  860 
Indonesia  200.0  221.9  1,110 
Japan  126.0  4,772.3  37,850 
Korea  46.0  485.2  10,550 
Laos  5.0  1.9  400 
Malaysia  21.0  98.2  4,680 
Myanmar  47.0  ---  --- 
New Zealand  4.0  60.5  16,480 
Philippines  73.0  89.3  1,220 
Singapore  3.0  101.8  32,940 
Thailand  61.0  169.6  2,800 
Vietnam  77.0  4.5  320 
Latin America       
Argentina  36.0  305.7  8,570 
Bolivia  8.0  7.4  950 
Brazil  164.0  773.4  4,720 
Chile  15.0  73.3  5,020 
Colombia  38.0  86.8  2,280 
Ecuador  12.0  19.0  1,590 
Mexico  95.0  348.6  3,680 
Panama  3.0  8.4  3,080 
Paraguay  5.0  10.2  2,010 
Peru  25.0  60.8  2,460 
Urguay  3.0  19.4  6,020 
Venezuela  23.0  78.7  3,450 
Source: Asian Times Online, September 07, 1999 and World Development Report 1997-1998.   27 
Figure 1 Tariff Reductions in Latin America 
 
 
Figure 2 Net Resource Flows to Latin America 
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Figure 4 Privatization in Latin America and Asia 
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